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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STAT'E OF UTAH
H. L. ALLRED, DEVON J. l\1cKEE,
ORIN (HANK) SWAIN, JOSEPH
WILCKEN, and ORLAN COOK,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vs.-

Case No. 8867

UNION SEED COMPANY and
WAYNE MALIN,
Defendants,
UNION SEED COMPANY,
Appellant.
I

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by alfalfa seed growers to recover
money damages for the value of certain seed. The Union
Seed Company of Burley, Idaho received the seed in
question from Wayne :Malin, who operated as its special
purchasing agent in Roosevelt, Utah. Union Seed Company paid :Malin for the seed, but Malin failed to pay the
growers. The trial court entered judgment against both
l\1alin and Union Seed Company for the value of all seed
that had been so transferred and for which full payment had not been made. From this judgment Union Seed
Company has appealed.
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STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION
The theory and facts upon which the trial court
bottomed its findings, conclusions and decree cannot be
set forth with clarity if we confine our brief to a point
by point response to appellant's brief. We will, therefore,
devote the first part of this brief to an analysis of the
case as it really is and as we think the trial court saw it.
To the extent consistent with sound organization, we shall
respond to appellant's brief in the first section of our
brief. To the extent that this is impracticable, we shall
respond to the remaining portions of appellant's brief
in the final section of our brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
\Ye agree with appellant to the effect that the facts
of this case are not in dispute, and, in essence, we agree
with appellant's Statement of Facts. There are, however,
several important facts which we wish to add and emphasize for the purpose of clarifying the nature of the alfalfa
seed transactions which are the subject of this suit.
The transactions were understood and approved by
appellant and are of considerable significance in determining the scope of authority of appellant's agent. \Ye
will, therefore, giYe a rather con1plete statement of facts
at this time to avoid repeating the facts under each
point of argument.
Prior to 1950 'Yayne :1\[alin owned and operated a
rPtail outlet for fanners· supplies in Roosevelt, rtah,

( R. :~:>). 11 (\ owned a warehouse and sold various supplies
to 1nost of the local far1ners, including the respondents,
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(R. 35). In 1950 a Mr. Barnes and a Mr. Taylor from
appellant Union Seed Company in Burley, Idaho contacted Mr. Malin and asked him if he would serve as a
special agent for appellant for the purpose of purchasing
alfalfa seed, (R. 6). Mr. Malin said that he would, and
appellant Union Seed Company procured the necessary
license from the State Department of Agriculture for
Mr. Malin to so serve, (R. 31, Plaintiff's Exhibits A, D
& E). Mr. Malin was not licensed to purchase seed for
other third parties, but only to serve as agent for appellant. The alfalfa seed growers in the Roosevelt area were
informed as to the nature of this arrangement, and, when
negotiating to buy their seed, Mr. Malin told them that
he was buying for Union Seed Company, (R. 24).
Appellant furnished to Malin a seed cleaning machine, known as a clipper, which was used to clean the
seed which the growers brought into his warehouse, (R.
25). Appellant also supplied Malin with bags, and Malin
in turn furnished these bags to the growers so that they
could bag their seed and bring it into his warehouse,
(R. 70-72). Appellant charged Malin for the bags, crediting him for all bags returned, but Malin did not charge
the growers for the bags if they sold their seed to appellant, (Finding of Fact No.4). When the growers brought
their seed into his warehouse, Malin would tag it with a
lot number and store it until he could run it through the
clipper, take a sample, and forward the sample to appellant where it was tested for purity and germination, (R.
6). Appellant would return a grade which would indicate
the per cent of purity of the particular sample of seed,
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(R. 6, 33). Sometimes a purchase price offer was included
with the grade and sometimes it wasn't, (R. 32-35). If
not, Malin often called appellant by telephone to determine what price he was authorized to offer for a particular grade of alfalfa seed, (R. 3-±). The offering price
was dependent upon the market and also on the grade of
the sample, and better grades of seed would receive
better prices than the lower grades, (R. 33-34, 48-49).
The market for alfalfa seed notoriously varies much
within any season, and ~Ialin had to keep in contact with
appellant from day to day in order to know y,-hat price
to offer for a particular grade of seed, (R. 34). The
rnarket, because of this substantial fluctuation, often
reached a point where it was virtually impossible to sell
the seed, (R. -!:8). And at times w-hen the market was low,
even though seed could be sold, many growers refused to
sell because they preferred to w-ait until the market price
hecarne rnore favorable, (R. 48-49).
Because of the fact that the growers often needed
mmH_·~- before their seed w-as harvested or before they
werP willing to aeeept a particular rnarket price, and
lH'cau~<' t ht•y nearly always sold their seed to appellant,
th<'~· cu~tomaril~- accepted advance smns of rnoney from
appPllant. ~rhen, when the growers sold their seed, they
n·<·Pin'd the purchase price less the amount which they
had n'<'Pin•d as adYanres. The evidence shows that more
than half of the growers cust01narily accepted these adv:nH'<'~ ( l~~xhihih• H, 1\::. L. N), and that it was not un<'OIIImon for growers to receive two or three such advall<'<':-;

lwforP the seed was final!~- sold and settlement
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made. It was customary for appellant to advance these
sums of money while the seed was still ripening in the
field, or after it was harvested but before it was taken
to Malin's warehouse, or after it was delivered to the
warehouse but before it had been cleaned, sampled or
graded. Because of the extreme importance which these
transactions have in this case, we will illustrate some typical examples below.
Before citing these examples, however, it will be
helpful to observe that the method instituted to pay
for all seed purchased was by draft which Malin would
draw upon appellant and make payable to the particular
grower, (R. 7, 8). The local bank would not permit the
growers to draw credit against these drafts until they
had been accepted and honored by appellant in Burley,
(R. 17-18). This usually took several days, (R. 17-18).
Since most of the growers were desirous of receiving
the money on the advance immediately, Malin began to
pay them by his personal check. He would then make
appellant's drafts payable to himself and deposit them
in his private account to cover the personal checks which
he had written in payment of seed which he had purchased for appellant. This procedure was fully approved
by Mr. Barnes, who was appellant's manager, (R. 18-19).
Soon, however, Malin began to draw drafts payable to
himself as a matter of his own personal financial convenience, and the growers often did not receive payment
for their seed, (R. 19-21). Malin also sold to appellant
seed which he had not been authorized by the growers to
sell (keeping the money for himself), and even went so
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far as to sell to appellant seed which the growers specifically instructed him not to sell (keeping the money
for himself), (R. 41).
Even though Malin drew these drafts payable to
himself, he was obligated to list on the draft the commodity purchased, the lot number, the number of bags
purchased, the gross weight, the net weight, the purchase
price per unit, the dollar amount of the purchase, and
the amount of his commission, (Exhibits H, K, L, N). In
this manner, appellant was informed as to the purpose
and nature of each draft, even though such draft was
drawn in Malin's name.
The draft books are in evidence. There were three
copies of each draft: A pink copy, which was given to the
payee; a white copy, which was sent to appellant; and a
blue copy, which was left in the draft book. There are
four such books in evidence, covering a period from December 8, 1953 to March 6, 1956. Chronologically, they
are Exhibits, H, N, L, and K. In citing the following
transactions, we will simply refer to the exhibit and the
draft number. For exmnple, N-2623 would refer to draft
number 2623 in Exhibit N.
In viewing these transactions, it is well to keep in
1nind the fact that these drafts fully revealed to appellant
11H' nature of the particular transaction. as it honored
each draft. "\Ye \Yill now turn to illustrative instances of
advmw<>8, part paynwnts. and purchases.
1. Outri!lht Purchases: "\Ye use the term "outright
purcha8r" to designate those purchases of seed upon
which there had been no advance payment and for which
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the full purchase price was paid at the time of the sale.
There were many of these transactions. Sometimes the
drafts were made payable to the grower (N-2633, N-2623),
but more often they were made payable to Malin (N -2615,
X-2617).

2. Down Payment or Part Payment when Price and
Weight are Determined: At times a purchase was made
and a down payment or part payment would be made
by appellant, and the balance would be paid at a later
date. The usual reason for defer~ing full payment was
because the exact weight could not be determined until
all of the seed had been "clippered." Illustrative of this
situation is the case of one J. E. Wilcken. On November
11, 1954 (check is misdated 1953) Wilcken sold Lot No.
1719, consisting of 135 bags and a gross weight of 18,780
pounds, for a price of 39c per pound, and was given an
"advance" of $4,000.00 which was drawn in the name of
the grower, (N-2647). One week later, on November 19,
1954, Wilcken was given a second "advance" of $2,500.00
on the same lot of seed, but this draft was drawn in
Malin's name, (L-2301). Still later, on November 21,
1954, final settlement was made on this lot of seed and
the balance of $792.64 was drawn in the name of Malin,
(L-2308). In this case there is a discrepancy of only 81
pounds, since the final settlement was in payment of
18,699 pounds and the initial draft reported 18,780
pounds. A similar transaction wherein appellant and
grower agreed on a price for a specific lot of seed and a
sale was consummated, but final settlement was not made
until the exact number of pounds was determined, is that
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of Forrest Hancock. He sold Lot No. 1103, consisting of
238 bags, for 20.6c per pound on November 9, 1954. Hancock was on that day given a draft in his name in the
amount of $2,500.00 as an "advance," (N-2642). The
exact weight was determined two weeks later and Hancock received a second draft in his name in the amount
of $3,796.17, which completed payment of the full pur<·hase price, (L-2310). (See also, N"-2623, X-2628, X-2629).
The transactions discussed under this section are
actually sales at the date of first payment, since a specific quantity of seed "~as sold for a specific price per
pound. Sometimes the total weight ·was determined at
the time of sale, but usually the seed had not been run
through the clipper for cleaning and the final weight
could not be ascertained until later.
3. Adt·ances on Seed TVhich zcas Harcested but not
8 old: This see1ns to be one of the most common arrangements. "\Yhen a grower harvested a certain number of
bags, advance su1ns were often paid on such seed before
an:~ purchase price was accepted. Typical of this arrangeInent is the case of Joe Page. On Septe1nber :21, 195:1:
1\falin drP\\~ a draft in his (:J[alin·s) nan1e as an advance
on 50 hags of seed owned by Joe Page. (X-2602). )lore
than four nwnths later, on Janmu:~ :26, 1955. a price was
a<'<'<'Pi<'d and .:\lalin dn\w the balance in his name for
payllH'nt of Pagt\ ·s st\Pd. (L-:23:29). Silnilarly. Hamblin
wa~ giv<'n an :ulvmwt\ on October :21. 195± for 9:2 bags of
~<·Pd (N-:2(i:!l), and 'nl$ paid purportedly the balance
1nor<' thnn two nwnths later wht•n a purchase price was
purported I:~ :wet\ph•d and weights deter1nined, (L-2324).
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(See page 38 of this brief.) Sometimes the period
between the advance and the sale and settlement would
be as long as eight months, (N-2604, N-2601, L-2330).
Sometimes the drafts would provide that the seed was
"to be clippered before settlement is made" (K-2524,
K-2533), or "to be sold as soon as clippered and grades
received" (N-2609). Sometimes the bags of seed had been
brought into the plant before the advances were made and
sometimes they hadn't. It was common to write "not all
in plant yet" (L-2348), or "bags to be brot in and clippered" (K-2543), or, simply, "bags in plant" (L-2343). Also,
it was common to merely note on the draft that the advance payment was for an approxi1nate number of bags
(L-2337, L-2340, N-2601, N-2603, N-2604, N-2621). And
sometimes the draft merely reflected an estimated number of pounds of seed, (H-2441, H-2442, H-2443, N-2606,
N-2614).
It was also common for appellant to make several
advances on the same lot of seed before a sale was finally
consummated. Typical is the case of Lillie Wash and
Boyce J obe, who on September 1 received an advance
on an estimated amount of seed (H-2441, H-2442), received a second advance more than three months later,
November 10 (listing the Lot Number and gross) (N2646), and finally accepted a purchase price and sold on
December 14 (L-2319). A similar case is that of Alma
Wills, explained by drafts N-2635, L-2317, L-2318. Some-

times Malin.would draw a draft to himself indicating that
it was in payment of second and third advances on seed
for which no purchase price had been accepted, (L-2311).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

4. Advances on Seed which was not Harvested: The
drafts reveal that appellant often advanced money to
growers for seed which was still ripening in the field
and which had not been harvested. These payments were
often made as early as September, and would designate
a number of acres upon which the advance was being
made, as "20 acres" (L-2341), or "25 acres" (L-2339),
or "35 acres" (L-2338, L-2342). The settlement would
be made when the seed was harvested and sold.
5. Drafts Without Explanation or for Advance
Commission: The facts suggest that appellant accepted
and honored :M.:alin's drafts without inquiry. On August
11, 1955 ~Ialin drew to himself a draft in the sum of
$1,499.64 with no explanation at all (L-2332). On January 11, 1954, ~Ialin drew a draft to himself in the amount
of $800.00 as a "commission advance" (H-2430). Similarly, on :\larch 1, 1954, Malin drew to himself a draft
in the amount of $700.00 as "advance on commission"
(I I -:2-l:W). There \Yas no other explanation on these
drafts. Yet, they were forthwith paid b~- appellant.

\Ye haYP listed several different types of transact ion~ which ~lalin, as appellant's agent, entered into
with the seed growers. Appellant was fully aware of
t II<>~<' t ran~adion~ ~ince it received a copy of the yery
draft~ whieh we haYe cited to show the type of trans:wt ion~ ,dtich took place. ~-\.ppellant neYer refused to
lllak<' paynH'nt on an~- of these drafts, but expressly ap1) rovPd these pay1nent procedures without ascertaining
"·hat adnal disposition Malin was making with the n1oney
drawn in his nanw. (R. 19).
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The respondents in this suit represent two groups
of the seed growers. One group of respondents rejected
the initial purchase offer tendered by appellant and
instructed Malin to hold their seed until the market price
was acceptable to them. Malin, contrary to these instructjons, sold their seed to appellant, received payment
therefor by draft drawn in his own name, and appropriated the money to his own use, (R. 41).
The second group of respondents delivered their
seed to Malin and had neither accepted nor rejected any
of appellant's offers to purchase. Malin sold their seed·
to appellant, received payment therefor by drafts drawn
in his name, and appropriated the money to his own use.
When they inquired as to the status of their seed, they
were told it was in storage in Malin's plant, being cleaned, or held in storage at appellant's plant in Burley,
(R. 29).
Both groups of respondents were awarded judgment
against Appellant and Malin for the full value of their
seed less any advances which had been made to them.
The Union Seed Company has appealed.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT NO. 1
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING APPELLANT
LIABLE FOR THE VALUE OF SEED WHICH RESPONDENTS HAD REFUSED TO SELL.
POINT NO.2
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING APPELLANT
LIABLE FOR THE VALUE OF SEED WHICH IT RECEIVED,
AND FOR WHI.CH RESPONDENTS WERE NOT FULLY
PAID.
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POINT NO.3
DIRECT RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING APPELLANT
LIABLE FOR THE VALUE OF SEED WHICH RESPONDENTS HAD REFUSED TO SELL.

Under this point we will discuss only those respondents who specifically instructed :Jialin not to sell their
seed. They took their seed to :Jialin's seed storage plant
where it was to be cleaned, sampled and stored until such
time as it was sold to a purchaser, presumably appellant.
Respondents knew and understood that :Jialin was licensed only as the agent for appellant, and they normally
sold their seed to appellant after it had been cleaned and
sampled, and after they had been offered a price which
was acceptable to the1n. Respondents knew that the alfalfa ~eed 1narket fluctuated every year and that the
san1e buyer offered yarying prices at different times for
the same qualit~~ of seed. These respondents did not ac<'Ppt the price initially offered by appellant, and they in~trueted .Jlalin to continue to hold their seed until such
tilll<' as they were offered a price satisfactory to them.
U11 kllo\\·n to these n•spondents. :Jialin sold and disJH>~Pd of their seed in a n1anner cmupletely adverse to
tiiPir ownt>rship rights. Tlris wrongful appropriation
of rP~pmHlPnts• sel'd eonstituted a conversion. ~\.ppellant,
a~ w<>ll as i\lalin, is liable for the full Yalue of all seed
whi<'h it n'<'PiY<_'d as a result of :J[alin·s wrongful appropriation. Appellant was apparently unaware of the fact
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that this seed had been converted by its agent Malin, but
that fact is of no consequence with regard to appellant's
liabilty for conversion. Professor Prosser, in stating
one of the most elemental rules of conversion, declares:
"The intent required is not necessarily a
matter of conscious wrongdoing. It is rather an
intent to exercise a dominion or control over the
goods which is in fact inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights. A purchaser of stolen goods or an
auctioneer who sells them in the utmost good faith
becomes a converter, since his acts are an interference with the control of the property. A mistake of law or fact is no defense. 'Persons deal
with the property in chattels or exercise acts of
ownership over them at their peril,' and must take
the risk that there is no lawful justification for
their acts. The essential problem is whether the
interference is of so serious a character as to require the defendant to buy the goods."

* * *
"Upon much the same basis, a bona fide purchaser of the goods from one who has no power
to transfer them becomes a converter when he
takes possession to complete the transaction."
PROSSER, TORTS §15 (1941).
The Idaho case of Federal Land Bank v. McCloud,
52 Idaho 694, 20 P.2d 201 summarizes the rule in a similar manner:
"One who buys property must, at his peril,
ascertain the ownership ; and if he buys of one
having no authority .to sell, his taking possession
in denial of the owner's right is a conversion."
It is unnecessary to dwell at greater length upon
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this rule of law, since it is one of the most fundamental
in the entire field of torts, and is universally recognized.
Appellant contends that there was no conversion because title to the seed in question passed to appellant.
It is difficult to see how this could be. The Sales .Act,
cited by appellant, could hardly be more express:
"Where there is a contract to sell specific
or ascertained goods, the property in them is
transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred.''
Utah Code Annotated, Section 60-2-2 (1953).
When there is a contract to sell, the intent of the parties
is controlling with regard to passage of title. In the
instant fact situation there was not even a contract to sell.
The offer had been rejected. Appellant's agent had been
instructed by respondents to retain the seed and not to
sell it until the market was more favorable. There intent
could not be more clear. It is suggested, on page 21 of
appellant's brief. that appellant could acquire title under
the theory that l\Ialin was agent of respondents and that
he had possession of the seed with indicia of ownership.
But this rule of law is wholly inapplicable because :Malin
was and continued to ren1ain appellant's purchasing
ag-Pnt; appellant knew that Malin was not buying seed
in his oVtrn natne for resale to appellant: and each draft
drawn h~· l\falin revealed to appellant the fact that Malin
wa~ hu~·ing for appellant. Each draft usually showed
tlt<' growt>r and included a conunission to :Jialin . .Appellant also knPw that l\falin "·as a bailee of the seed which
wa~ in hi~ possl'ssion. The fads can in no way be twisted
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to apply the rule of law for which appellant contends.
Title did not pass. Appellant received seed wrongfully
appropriated by 11alin, and, however innocent, is liable
to these respondents for the full value of such seed.
Appellant further argues that the decision not to sell
on the part of these respondents amounted to collusion
(page 21 of appellant's brief) and conspiracy (page 24
of appellant's brief). Such contentions are wholly untenable. These respondents who refused to sell their seed
simply decided to wait for what they thought would be
a more favorable market. They honestly declared their
intentions, and such conduct was customary, appropriate,
and completely familiar to appellant. The probability
was that they would subsequently sell their seed to appellant, but they were not bound to do so, and if they sold
to someone else they were charged a certain amount for
appellant's bags which they used to bag their seed, as
well as a storage fee. If we were to accept the view of
appellant, i.e., that one is guilty of collusion and conspiracy if he refuses to accept an initial purchase offer, then
respondents would have been faced with the choice of
either accepting the initial offer, however unfavorable,
or of being guilty of conspiracy and collusion. This would
be absurd. Appellant's contention is completely without
merit and there is nothing to indicate that the activities
of these respondents was anything but customary and
honest.
A third contention of appellant is that these respondents are estopped from asserting their claim, or
that they have waived such right, because a period of
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more than a year passed from the wrongful appropriation to the filing of the complaint, and during such interval they did not complain directly to appellant. Once
again, this contention is without merit. These respondents had no duty to inquire concerning the status of their
seed, because they directed Malin not to sell their seed
and thus understood that it was being held until they
were willing to sell, and they had no indication that anything had happened to their seed which was contrary
to their instructions. Further, it is difficult to understand the significance of appellant's argument, for the
tort of conversion was complete at the moment appellant
received possession of the wrongfully appropriated seed.
Hespondents' cause of action was then created. These
respondents could have rightfully waited the full period
of the statute of limitations from the time they knew or
reasonably should have known of the conversion, if they
had so desired, without waiving any rights or being estopped.
In ~mmlutn-, then, it seems abundantly clear that
t l1 is group of respondents left their seed in the possession
nf ~I alin for the purpose of cleaning, sampling, and storin(r
until such tiine as a price was offered which was
/""'>
:u·<·Pptahle to then1. ..:\ppt.•llant's initial offering price
"·a~ unae<'Ppta hlP, and they instructed :JJalin not to sell,
lmt to hold the seed until such tiine as the Inarket offered
a ~ati~l'a<'tor~- pri<'t.>. Contr:.u·~- to these instructions,
~I alin "-rongl~- appropriated the seed by selling it to

appPllanL Despite appellant's seeming good faith, the~w
faet~

elearly constitute a conversion.
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POINT NO.2
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING APPELLANT
LIABLE FOR THE VALUE OF SEED WHICH IT RECEIVED,
AND FOR WI-UCH RESPONDENTS vVERE NOT FULLY
PAID.

Under this point we will discuss those respondents
who delivered their alfalfa seed to Malin's plant for
storage, cleaning, sampling, and grading, while negotiating for a purchase price. l\Iany of these respondents
received advances on the seed which they expected subsequently to sell, but the record is silent as to whether
any of them ever accepted a purchase price and consummated a sale. If they did not sell there is a conversion.
If they did, they are entitled to be paid the balance due.
Appellant takes the position that the trial court
based the entire judgment upon the theory of conversion.
This is not so. The trial court found that appellant had
received certain seed for which respondents had not been
fully paid (Findings of Fact Nos. 10 & 12). The court
then simply determined that appellant was liable to respondents for all seed so received, (Conclusion of Law
No. 1, Decree No. 1). The court further determined that
defendant Malin converted the seed of those respondents
who had instructed him not to sell, and also converted
the money of those respondents who had not refused to
sell but who had not been fully paid, (Conclusion of Law
No. 3, Decree No. 3). The fact that Malin's liability to
both groups of respondents rests upon the theory of
conversion does not necessarily mean that appellant's
entire liability is based upon the same theory. Appellant
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is liable under a tort action for conversion to those respondents who refused to sell their seed, (as we discussed
under Point I), but, as to those respondents who had no1
expressly refused to sell their seed, and who were not
fully paid, appellant is liable either under a tort action
for conversion (if the sale were without authority), or a
contract action for the purchase price (if :M:alin had
growers implied consent to sell).
Since there is absolutely nothing in the evidence,
findings, conclusions, or decree to indicate that these
respondents accepted a purchase price or that title to
their seed passed to appellant, we submit that appellant's
contention that title did pass is wholly unfounded. In
fact, the fair purport of the evidence would seem to indicate that respondents did not sell their seed. An indication of this is found in the following testimony of Mr.
~lalin.

"A.

:Jiany of then1 had their seed stored in my
place in Roosevelt.

Q. But uwst of them knew you had shipped the
seed out to Union Seed Company in Burley~
A.

That would be in '35 and '56- '55.

Q.

You 1nean that the~- did lmow that in 1955,
that it was being shipped!

A.

Generally, yes.

Q.

\riH'n thP)- didn't n=-C'PiYe payment and asked
vou about it. You told then1 it was still being
held in storag~ up in Burley?

A.

l~~itiH'r that or I had it in 1ny own place or it
\ras ht>ing cleaned. I Inean, it was a general
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conversation. I don't remember of anything
definite, the wordings and so forth.

Q. You didn't tell them in any instance that you
had received payment from Union Seed Company and not turned it over to them~
A.

That is right.

Q.

You concealed that fact from them until after
the 1956 deliveries~

A.

Right.

Q.

By giving them one excuse or another as to
where their seed

A.

was~

Right." (R. 29)

Just prior to this testimony quoted, Mr. Malin had
been speaking about the respondents who had instructed
him not to sell their seed. But then he began a general
discussion of those growers who inquired concerning
the whereabouts of their seed and payment for their seed.
The testimony just quoted refers to respondents generally. From the nature of the excuses given by Mr. Malin,
it seems that the respondents who inquired were essentially interested in the whereabouts of their seed rather
than in receiving the balance of any purchase price. If
respondents had sold their seed and were entitled to a
balance of their purchase price, then it certainly seems
that they would have requested the remainder of their
money rather than information concerning the location
of the seed.
As a further indication that title did not pass, there
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chase price. When their seed was "sold" by Malin, he
simply kept their money and did not inform them of what
he had done. \V e could cite specific cases of several respondents, but we will confine our examples to Huber
and Hamblin. Appellant, on page 17 of its brief, selects
Huber and Hamblin as two respondents who allegedly
demonstrate the general complacency of respondents in
not demanding the balance of the purchase price which
was payable to them. The facts with regard to these two
growers conclusively show, ho·wever, that they had merely
received advances; that they had not accepted a purchase
price or sold their seed; and that title to their seed did
not pass. \Y e have discussed the cases of Huber and
llamblin in detail on pages 38-40 of this brief in response
to appellant's argument on waiver and estoppel. \Ye have
1nade reference at this time to these two respondents
becau~e the transactions concerning them demonstrate
not only that their clai1ns are not barred by estoppel or
waiYPI'. but also that title to their seed did not pass to
appellant.
There i ~. therefore, strong evidence to show that
mo~t of the respondents did not sell their seed. The record. lln\n'Y<'I'. does not conclusively show that none of the
r<>~pondenb sold their sPed. But, assuming arguendo
t lw t none of respondents sold their seed, ~Ir. ~Ialin w·ould
haY<' \\Tongfull~· appropriated and transferred to appellant ~('t>d t n which he had neither title nor authority to
~<' 11. A p p<' II ant would then be liable as a converter to all
r<>~tHmdPnt~ for thP reasons set forth in our Point Ko.l.
A~~uming.

on the other hand, that son1e of these
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respondents actually did sell their seed and title passed
to appellant as appellant contends, we will move now to a
consideration of appellant's liability for the purchase
price. The evidence indisputably shows that appellant
understood and approved procedures whereby Mr. Malin
made purchases, down payments, part payments, and
advances on seed which had not yet been purchased and,
indeed, -in many cases on seed that had not even been
harvested. We have fully illustrated these practices and
procedures in our Statement of Facts. It cannot be shown
that Mr. Malin entered into any transaction which was
contrary to instructions or authority which he had been
given by appellant, except for the actual conversions in
question. We think that this is a clear case of express
authority wherein the agent acts in the very kind of
transaction which the principal has approved, and, in so
acting, wrongfully converts to himself the money which
he received from the principal.
Since we are now assuming that title to the seed in
question passed to appellant, and since it has been shown
that any sales so consummated would have been with
the approval of appellant, we will briefly set forth the
law on acts of agents which are expressly authorized h)'
the principal.
In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 3, § 231 (at page
142) we read:
"A principal is liable for the acts of his agent
within his express authority, because the act of
such agent is the act of the principal. Where the
agent acts within the scope of the authority which
the principal holds him out as possessing, or

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
knowingly permits him to assume, the principal
is made responsible, because to permit him to dispute the authority of the agent in such a case
would be to enable him to commit a fraud upon
innocent third parties. (Citing cases.)
Continuing in Section 233 (page 144):
"Where an agent acts on behalf of a disclosed
principal, and commits acts in the principal's
name, such acts and contracts, within the scope
of the agent's authority, are generally considered
as the acts and contracts of the principal and are
binding upon him, ... (citing cases)."
Continuing in Section 241 (page 163) :
". . . a principal is liable to third persons
on all contracts made for him by his agent while
acting in the course of his employment and within
the scope of his authority, ... (citing cases)."
Malin, as appellant's agent, had express authority
from appellant to enter into every transaction which is
the subject matter of this suit. The mere fact that :.\Ir.
Malin was enabled by his position to wrongfully appropriate money and seed in no wa~- excuses appellant from
liability.
In order to show that ~falin acted beyond the scope
of his authority. appellant cites cases to the effect that
an agent cannot bind his principal b~- purchasing on
credit if he is given the cash to 1nake full pa~J.nent and
i:-; instructed not to buy on credit. "\Ye do not take ex<'Pption to thi~ rule of law as an abstraet principle,
but W<' think it has little application to the case at bar.
Ji~V<'r~·mH' - appellant, :.\lalin, and respondents - Imew
that the :-;alP~ were made directly to appellant and that
l\l alin did not have authority to purchase in his own
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name. Everyone concerned intended that, when a sale
was made, title would pass immediately and directly
to appellant. :Malin was not given the cash to make
payment for the seed which he purchased for appellant.
He was given drafts which he could draw against appellant, but these drafts had to be subsequently accepted
and honored by appellant. For this reason the local banks
1vould not permit the growers to draw credit against
these drafts until they had been so accepted and honored,
which usually took several days. If appellant considers
this procedure to be credit purchases, then appellant had
fully authorized such purchases and all of the cases
cited by appellant wherein the agent had no authority
to make credit purchases is irrelevant.
Appellant also clearly approved the practice adopted
by its agent ~falin whereby he would make an advance
payment on seed which was not harvested; or which,
if harvested, had not yet been purchased but which
appellant hoped to buy; or part payment on seed which
appellant bought. Appellant also expressly approved
~falin's practice of drawing to himself drafts in payment of these various transactions. If appellant considers these transactions to be credit purchases, then
appellant has still fully authorized such purchases and
the authority cited wherein the agent had no authority
to make credit purchases is irrelevant.
If on the other hand, appellant does not consider
the above arrangements or the transactions outlined
in the Statement of Facts to be credit purchases, then
we are unable to see where there was any credit pur-
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chases in the instant fact situation. There is no evidence
indicating that Malin ever made any payment that was
not fully and knowingly approved by appellant. Nowhere
is there any indication that anyone thought that respondents were selling their seed directly to Malin. Appellant
never intended to buy from any one but the grower.
Malin did not even purport to buy for his own account,
either on credit or for cash. X early every draft shows
Malin drawing a commission from appellant. Whatever
arrangements he made, he made for appellant. Again,
we repeat that there is absolutely no evidence of any
credit sales other than those arrangements which were
fully understood, authorized and approved by appellant.
The problem is simply that ::Malin, as appellant's agent
to purchase seed, failed to make full payment to the
growers for the seed which he shipped to appellant.
~..,urther, Malin was able to accomplish this wrongful
conduct by the very procedure which appellant had approved. The issue, therefore, is not at all concerned with
credit sales which a principal has instructed his agent
not to consum1nate because the principal supplies his
agent with ample cash. The real issue. rather, is the
question of who shall suffer when one of two innocent
parties must suffer from the wrongful acts of a third
:H·r~on.

Appellant, though careless in not ascertaining
the disposition which its agent was 1naking with the
monp~·

drawn in his naine, was in good faitl1 and, for

purpose~

of this argun1ent, will be considered an inno-

<'<'nt party.

App<•llant does eit<' one case which bears upon tlris
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issue. It involves a situation wherein the principal clothed
the agent with apparent authority and was thus held
liable for the loss. Since in the case at bar appellant
had given Malin actual, rather than apparent, authority
for the procedures he pursued, we submit that respondents stand in an even stronger position than the innocent
purchasers discussed hereafter. In the case cited by
appellant, ~Harrison vs . .A~~to Securities Co., 70 Utah 11,
257 Pac. 677 (1927), a state agency intrusted an automobile to a local agency for the purpose of exhibiting
it and soliciting buyers of cars. The local agency acted
contrary to instructions of its principal (the state
agency) and sold the car to an innocent purchaser.
This Court, in sustaining a judgment in favor of the
innocent purchaser, said:
"The trial court was of the op1n10n that it
appears from this record that one of two innocent parties must suffer from the wrongful act
of a third person, and that the loss should fall
upon the one who by his conduct created the
circumstances which enabled the third party to
perpetrate the wrong and cause the loss, and
determined the case on that principle of law. The
rights of the parties, in our judgment, could well
be ruled upon this general principle of law, and,
so ruled, would entitle plaintiff to recover."
In applying this case to the instant facts, appellant
argues that respondents were the parties who had created
the circumstances which enabled the wrong because they
failed to complain directly to appellant. Appellant's
position seems to be that if such complaints had been
made appellant would have discovered the wrongdoing
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of its agent and prevented further misconduct. It is
respectfully submitted that this interpretation by appellant is a gross misapplication of the rule of law pronounced by this case.
The state agency had intrusted an automobile to a
local agent for the purpose of exhibiting it, soliciting
buyers and making sales. The state agency, thus promoted by a desire for pecuniary profit, set in motion a
situation which caused an innocent purchaser to buy
a car which was to be for exhibition only. Both the state
agency and the purchaser were innocent parties, but
~l1e state agency had prompted and instituted the chain
of events which led to the loss which ultimately had to
be assessed against one of them. If things had gone as
planned, the state agency is the one who would have
1nade the profits and benefited from the situation which
it created. The court deemed it only fair to make the
state agency stand the loss, even though innocent because it had created the circun1stances which enabled
the third party (local agency) to perpetrate the wrong
and cause the loss.
In the case at bar appellant lTnion Seed Company
was prompted by a desire for pecuniary gain to appoint
l\f alin a~ special agent to purchase alfalfa seed. Under
this appointment, both Malin and appellant were to
profit. It so happened, howeYer. that these circun1stances
<'r<'at<~<l by appellant enabled l\Ialin to perpetrate a wrong
which ean~ed a loss whirh 1nust be assessed against either
appe11ant or respondents. Assu1ning that they are both
innocent parties, it seems manifestly clear that appellant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27
is the one who must bear the loss for it is he who
created the circumstances enabling the loss and it is he
who stood to profit from the wheels which he set in
motion.
All one need do is examine the drafts to determine
the freedom given to Malin by Appellant. Each draft,
of course, had to be honored before it was paid, and
at the time the draft was drawn, a white copy of it
showing in detail what it was for was sent by Malin
to Union Seed. The contention that Malin was dealing
as agent for the grower or that he was buying for his
own account and reselling to appellant is totally destroyed by the drafts. Malin, in every instance, provided
for a commission for himself. When he acted for
appellant in the purchase of seed, he was entitled
to a commission-on no other basis would the commission
have been payable. The settlement drafts show in nearly
tvery instance the name of the grower and a commission
to Malin. As is noted in more detail in the statement of
facts, he drew some drafts merely as advance commissions to himself-not related to any transaction, and these
were honored. In some instances he drew drafts without making any notation at all as to what it was for.
In others, he drew drafts showing merely that it was
an advance on 35 acres of seed. On others he put the
notation that the seed was to be brought in, etc. These
drafts were being honored one by pne as they were
presented. Appellant had actual knowledge of the method
being pursued by Malin. The drafts were payable to
himself and appellant elected to trust him.
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The contention being here made by appellant, that
~Ialin was provided with and instructed to pay cash,

and that he had no authority to deal in any other fashion,
simply is contrary to the record. Malin, in accordance
with what is probably the uniform custom in buying
alfalfa seed, made numerous types of deals. Because he
was drawing drafts to cover each one, appellant knew,
deal by deal, what he was doing. It is inconceivable
that appellant could receive a draft reading, "advance
for 35 acres of seed'' and think that title had passed,
or the seed had been harvested, graded, sampled, etc.
ln fact, appellant knew that this could not be, for under
the procedure which always preceded the sale, the seed
was given a lot number. It was cleaned and sampled.
The samples were sent to appellant and graded and
priced, and at this time M:alin knew the price he was
authorized to pay. So when these first drafts came in
for 35 acres of seed, without lot nmnber, sample, grade,
or weight, even without any description of quantity,
appellant knew positively that ~Ialin "-as Inaking an
"~HlYanre." It could tell frmn the date and from the
description of the seed as being so n1any acres that the
seed was still gro•wing unharvested.
The problen1 of purchasing agricultural produce
frmn fanners and then not paying for it. has obviously
bPPJl a continuing and 8Prious problen1. The Legislature,
tiH'r<'l'orP, adopted Chapter 1. Title 5. r.C.A. 1953, to
proiPet the fanner. ~Pet ion 3 recited in a declaration of
policy:
1

"~l ltat

it i8 recognized that the producer of
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ards and losses in his dealings with certain persons who seek to obtain and do obtain from such
producer his products for resale."

As a result, the statute requires persons dealing
with producers of farm products to be licensed. A
person, representing a dealer, broker or commission
merchant, is required to be licensed as an agent, as
Malin was. Malin, under this statute had no authority
to buy on his own behalf. He was the agent of appellant
only, and had authority to buy on its behalf only and as
its agent. He was held out to the public as having this
capacity. Then, appellant, which had licensed him as its
:xgent, permitted the making of deals of various types,
and specifically knew that :Malin was making advances
and expressly authorized him to do so. The advance could
be made while the seed f\vas still growing in the field,
or after it was harvested but before delivery to Malin,
or after delivery to :Malin but before the purchase agreement had been completed, etc. Drafts drawn against
appellant for these advances were honored. Various
services were rendered to the grower, obviously for
the purpose of aiding the negotiation and ultimate purchase of the seed. Appellant made bags available prior
to any purchase agreement. The grower put his seed in
the bags so furnished, and if the sale was to appellants,
he didn't have to pay anything for the use of the bags.
If he sold his seed somewhere else, he did have to buy
the bags. Malin was storing the seed prior to the consummation of a deal. If a deal were finally closed, no
storage fee was charged. If it was not, he charged for
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storage. A machine twas furnished to clean the seed.
This happened before the seed was graded, priced and
bought, and the farmer was helped out financially by
advances being made to him before the sale, and sometimes even before the harvest. These things were all
calculated to morally bind the grower to sell to appellant. Malin was obviously given considerable latitude by
appellant, as is clearly evidenced by the various types
of deals that he made, and in the end result appellant
simply trusted Malin to the extent that he could draw
drafts upon it payable to himself and in many instances with very little or no descriptive information.
He could get advance commissions for himself. He
eventually drew some drafts without saying what they
were for. He had worked ~th appellant over a period
of years and it obviously trusted him, but more important
to this case is that the deals he was making were with
its knowledge, approval and consent, and it held him
out as its agent to make the deals.
One thing, and one thing only, went wrong. Malin
turned dishonest. He started drawing drafts pay-able
to himself, without paying the grower. \'l1en the growers
inquired about their seed, he gave the1n excuses~ but
basicall)· left the1n with the ilnpression that their seed
•wa~ ~till on hand. One draft at least. payable to a
1
growPr, wa~ forged by :l\falin. It doesn't 1natter how the
11roblein is approached - the seed was delivered to
appellant'~ agent in accordance with the established cus1om. The seed for whirh respondents have been given
judgmPnt actua1ly was received by appellant and used
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by it. Respondents have not been paid for their seed.
True, appellant has advanced the money to its agent,
~ialin, but he did not turn the money over to the grower
who owned the seed, and the growers are entitled to
payment.
The law in other jursidictions is in near universal
accord with the Utah position. When a principal appoints
an agent for the conduct of certain business affairs
which are designed to benefit the principal, the principal
is estopped from denying the apparent authority of the
agent and any loss occasioned by the agent's apparent
authority will be assessed against the principal rather
than against innocent parties dealing with the agent.
Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 2, § 96 (page 1211)
states the rule as follows:
"The doctrine of apparent authority rests
upon principles of estoppel, or in the nature of
an estoppel, forbidding one to deny to the prejudice of those he has misled the consequences
of an appearance of power which he produced.
"The basi::.; upon which this rule is usually
deemed to rest consists in the fact that apparent
authority is regarded as being in the nature of
authority by estoppel, the great preponderance
of cases which consider this phase of the subject
expressing the view, in substance, that the principal, having clothed the agent with the semblance of authority, by his conduct or inaction
as the case may be, will not be permitted after
others have been led to act in reliance on the
appearances thus produced, to deny, to the prejudice of such others, what he has theretofore
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tacitly affirmed as to the extent of the agent's
powers. (citing cases).
"Whether or not estoppel, in its technical
sense, is regarded as underlying the rule, apparent authority at any rate is nearly related thereto,
implying a transaction itself invalid and a person who is forbidden for equitable reasons to set
up that invalidity; a principal may bind himself
by causing others to believe the agent's authority
to be greater than actually is the case. (citing
cases) Ultimately it is but another application of
the fundamental maxim that any loss from misconduct of a third person should fall on that one
of two imzucent perso;ls dealing through him who,
by his co11j'idence, had made the loss possible.
(citing cases)
"To permit the principal to dispute the
agent's authority in such a situation zrould be
to allozc him to commit a fraud upon the rights
of innocent persons.,•· (Citing cases) (emphasis
added)
The general law of agency applicable to the case
at bar seen1s to be too clear to be disputable. The above
quotations set forth the law with regard to the apparent
authori t~- of an agent which pennits him to act to the
prejudice to an innocent purchaser. \Yhen :Jialin converted respondents' seed or n10ney. he exceeded his
authorit~-. but sinee :Jfalin accmnplished this by ,-irtue
of the YPhielP which appellant had giYen hun, appellant
i~ liable to respondents.
If appellant had t)XL\reised care and caution in these
tran~adion~. and it' ~lalin'::' authority was only apparent
(rather than Pxpress). it is sub1nitted that appellant
would still be liabh) to respondents under the law just
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quoted. It is repeated, however, that the instant case is
one where the principal did not use due care in dealing
·with his agent, and, further, that the agent had express,
rather than apparent, authority. This reinforces the position of respondents to a degree where it is difficult to
see how appellant can escape liability.
Under this point we have shown that appellant is
liable to respondents whether or not title passed to
appellant. If title passed, appellant is liable to respondents for the purchase price; if title did not pass, appellant is liable to respondents for conversion.
POINT NO.3
DIRECT RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF.

We shall now proceed to examine, point by point,
the brief of appellant. To the extent that we have
already responded to sections of appellant's brief, we
will so indicate by reference to earlier sections of this
brief. Though the wording of appellant's points of argument suggests that the trial court reached conclusions
that it did not reach, we will, as a matter of simplicity
and convenience, accept appellant's phraseology.
(a) The Trial Court Did Not Err In Its lVfemorandum Opinion And Its Finding That Wayne
lV.falin Converted Plaintiff's Seed And That
F nion Seed Company Is Liable For The
Value Of The Seed Because Of Conversion.
We will make two observations with regard to this
point of appellant's brief. First, appellant's liability
for conversion does not rest merely upon the fact that
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appellant's agent converted respondents' seed. Not at
all! Appellant was held liable for only that seed which
it received and appropriated to its own use in a manner
contrary to the rights of the owners. This is to say that
appellant is liable for its own conversion, rather than
for the conversion of its agent.
The second observation is with regard to passage
of title. Point No. 1 of appellant's brief is devoted exclusively to the contention that title to all of the seed
in question passed to appellant and there thus could
have been no conversion. \V e have shown under our
Point No. 1 that title could not have passed with regard
to those respondents who refused to sell their seed.
Under our Point No. 2 we discussed those respondents
who had not specifically refused to sell their seed, and
demonstrated that, though there is persuasive evidence
to show that title did not pass, the evidence does not
conclusively reveal that title to none of the seed passed.
\~r e there pointed out, however, that for the purpose of
sustaining the trial court's judgment, it is really immaterial whether or not title passed. If it did not. appellant
i~ liable as a ronYerter: if a sale was 1nade and title
did pa~~, appellant is liable for the purchase price.
(b) '1_1he Trial Court Did X ot Err In Finding

That \YaYlH' l\falin Acted \Vithin The Scope
Of I-Iis A.uthnrit~- .-\.~ A Special . Agent \Yhen
He l\fade Cn.'dit Purchases, .-\.nd In Finding
That The Respondents Did X ot \VaiYe ~1.ny
Claim Again~t Appellant B~- X ot De1nanding
And Obtaining Payment In Full )tt Time Of
Sale.
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Appellant actually forwards two arguments under
its Point No.2. These are (1) that Malin had no authority
to make credit purchases and, in allegedly so doing, he
acted beyond the scope of his authority, and (2) that respondents waived their rights to full payment by not making timely demands to appellant. Appellant's second
argument on waiver is the same as its argument under
Point No. 3 on estoppel, and in order to avoid undue
repetition we will defer response to that argument until
we discuss estoppel.
With regard to Malin's scope of authority, we would
like first to observe that an agent's scope of authority
is relevant for the purpose of determining whether a
principal shall be bound by the contracts of the agent.
Appellant's liability for conversion does not rest upon
the scope of authority of Malin, but upon appellant's
appropriation to itself of the ownership rights in respondents' seed. We make this distinction at this time
to clarify the theories of liability and the authority cited
to sustain these theories. Appellant takes the position
J~hat the trial court based its judgment solely upon conversion, and then appellant cites authority to show that
it was error to hold appellant liable for the purchase
price because the purchases were beyond the scope of
the agent's authority. Needless to say, the citations of
authority are not relevant to the legal proposition put
forward.
We have taken the position under our Point No. 2
of this brief that, as to those respondents who had not
refused to sell their seed, liability might be based upon
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either conversion or purchase price. Nothing additional
need be said with regard to that position, since we have
already argued it rather fully. We would like to point
out, however, that every citation of authority given by
appellant on pages 10-15 of its brief deals with an agent
who has been given cash by his principal and who has
been instructed to make only full cash payments on
purchase. Those citations of authority are not objectionable to us, but they have no application to the fact
situation before this court. Every mode and method of
payment used by :Jialin was accepted and approved by
appellant, as we have shown in our Statement of Facts.
Malin was not at any time given cash to make purchases;
he was limited to drawing drafts which had to be accepted and paid by appellant several days after purchase.
Appellant's brief, on page 10, states: ''There is no
evidence that the appellant ever authorized or knew of
a credit purchase. There is no e\idence that appellant
knew, or could have known, that the growers had not been
paid in full." \Y e haYe shown. in our State1nent of Facts,
that appellant approved various kinds of transactions,
and had knowledge that son1e accounts went longer than
eight months before final payn1ent was 1nade. ~-\ctuall~,,
1nost of the initial pay1nents 1nade b)T appellant through
J\1 alin wen' advances, and were not part payn1ents of the
pn reha~P priee. \Yhile it is quite possible that some of
these transactions were in the nature of credit sales. most
of then1 W<'l'f' naked adYaiH'l'S and were in no ·way credit
salt>~.
~al<'~.

And, as to those which 1night have been credit
it

i~

eh'ar that appellant approved such sales, as we
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have shown by those transactions listed under "Down
Payments or Part Payments" in the Statement of Facts.
We summarize our response to appellant's argument
on scope of authority in this manner: (1) Most of the
transactions were simply advances on seed which appellant later hoped to buy, and were not credit sales; and
(2) as to those transactions which might have been credit
sales, appellant had fully authorized such transactions.
(c) The Trial Court Did Not Err In Finding That
The Respondents Are Not Estopped From
Asserting Their Claims Against Appellant.
1.

As To All Respondents

As . we earlier indicated, we will discuss appellant's arguments as to both waiver and estoppel at
this time since both points are essentially the same.
Perhaps the simplest response to this part of appellant's
brief is to examine each illustration of fact and citation
of authority.

It is first contended, on top of page 16 of appellant's brief, that respondents waived their rights to
payment by not demanding full cash payment on delivery
of their seed. To support the contention that there is
a prima facie waiver of cash payment by not demanding
the same on delivery, appellant cites Comer v. Cunningham, 77 N.Y. 391, 33 Am. Rep. 626. Little need be said
in response to this contention of appellant, since respondents did not sell their seed when it was delivered. It
was delivered for the purpose of cleaning, sampling,
grading, and negotiating for a purchase price. To argue
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that respondents have waived the right to claim payment because they did not demand full cash payment
before their seed was weighed, cleaned, or sold, is to
pursue an unmeritorious contention.
In order to show that respondents were very negligent in not demanding full payment shortly after the
sale of their seed, appellant cites on page 17 of its
brief the cases of Huber and Hamblin. We think that
appellant has fairly cited two typical examples, but we
think that appellant has not shown what actually happened in those cases. Appellant says that both Huber
and Hamblin received payments on their seed prior to
December of 1954, and that in that month the seed \\~as
shipped and drafts in full payment were honored by
appellant. It is then asserted that respondents Hamblin
and Huber didn't tell appellant directly about not being
fully paid until :\Iay of 1956. Let us see what really
happened in these two cases.
Hamblin was given a draft in his name in the
amount of $1500 (not $1,700) on X ovember 21. 1954.
(N-2621) This pay1nent was siinply an .. advance on Lot
#1702-92 Bags.·· There was no ascertained weight and
no purchase price was given. Tins was n1erely a naked
advance and no sale was n1ade. Later, on Xovember
:2:~, 1Dr>-+, l\lalin drew a draft in his own na1ne for the
smn of $rl.500 whieh included a second ad"nuwe in the
mnount of $1,500 on Ha1nblin 's Lot #170~. (L-2311)
lian1hlin
CPllliH'r

IH'Yt>r

ktww about this second advance. On De-

:2:~, 1954 l\1 alin purportedly sold Han1blin's seed

for $31.7["> per one hundred pounds, took a connnission
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for the sale, deducted $3000 for the two $1500 advances
previously made, and drew a draft in his own name
for the balance of the purchase price, or $921.77. (L-2324)
Hamblin never knew about this purported sale. So, all
boiled down, the facts are simple. Hamblin was given
a $1500 advance on November 21, 1954, and was then
waiting to sell his seed. Malin drew a subsequent draft
in the amount of $1500 and also sold Hamblin's seed
without informing him. Appellant contends that Hamblin should have complained about not receiving full
payment on the sale of his seed, when Hamblin had no
knowledge that his seed had been sold. When the respondents did inquire as to the location of their seed
(not the purchase price, since they didn't know of any
sale), Malin gave them various explanations which they
apparently believed (R. 29). It is difficult to see how
Hamblin could have waived any right or be estopped
from asserting any claim under these facts.
The case of Huber, also cited by appellant, is essentially the same as that of Hamblin and we will attempt
to present it in a more abbreviated manner. Huber was
given an advance on November 10, 1954, and Malin
drew to himself a draft in the amount of $1400 (not
$1300). (N-2646) This was simply an advance; no price
was listed and no sale was made. On December 20, 1954
Malin sold Huber's seed and drew to himself the balance
of the purchase price. (L-2322) Huber did not know
of this disposition of his seed, but assumed that it was
still being held for sale. Once again, appellant charges
Huber with carelessness in not complaining about the
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balance of the purchase price on a sale which he did
not know had been made. Rather than complacency on
the part of Huber and Hamblin, the facts demonstrate
a conversion on the part of Malin, and, also, a conversion on the part of appellant. Such being the case,
Huber and Hamblin joined with other respondents in
bringing this action shortly after they discovered the
conversion.
Appellant's next citation is Cleveland '1:. Pearl, 63
Vt. 127, 21 Atl. 261 (1891), wherein an agent had been
given cash for payment but the seller accepted the
agent's personal check as part of the sale price. The
court said, by way of dictum, that the seller should
have notified the principal when the agent's personal
check bounced, so that the principal would have been
warned before settlement with the agent. This case has
no application, since in the case at bar the respondents
did not know that their seed had been sold or of any
other wrongdoing, and so had no knowledge of anything
about which to complain.
Appellant next cites ~ll orga 11 r. Georgia Paring ~·
Coustruction Co., 149 S.E. -±~G (Ga. 1929). wherein a
third part~-, with knowledge of the principal-agent relation~hip, chose to deal with the agent personally rather
than in his eapacit~- as agent. It was held that. in such
a situation, the principal cannot be held liable. It is
difficult to see how tllis case can be applied to the
I' ad~ ]>pforp this Court. None of the respondents ever
thought t hPy wPn"' selling seed directl~- to ~I a lin: ~Ialin
1P~til'i<>d that he never purchased seed in his ova1 name;
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and appellant knew that Malin was not licensed to deal
in his own name.
Appellant's next citation IS the I-I arrison case
(Utah), supra, which we have already fully discussed
under Point No. 2 of this brief.
Appellant then cites American Jurisprudence to the
effect that an agent has no authority to make credit
sales when he has been supplied with sufficient cash.
This citation is concerned with appellant's Point No. 2
which we have already discussed, and has no direct
bearing on waiver or estoppei~
Appellant's final citation under this point is Williston on Sales} 2:312. The essence of this citation is that
an agent, if he has been clothed with indicia of ownership by the owner, may pass title even though he has
been instructed by the owner not to sell. This rule is
usually limited to situations where the person so clothed
with indicia of ownership appears to the purchaser to
~;e the owner of the goods. This rule cannot apply to
the facts now before this Court. Appellant knew that
Malin did not own the seed in question, and that Malin
did not even have a license to permit him to buy or
deal in his own name. Further, Malin was appellant's
agent, not the agent of respondents.

It is not easy to follow the trend of appellant's
argument under this point because part of the authority
cited, as theM organ case, attempts to show that respondents sold their seed directly to Malin; whereas other
authority, as the Williston citation, attempts to show
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that respondents sold their seed directly to appellant by
giving Malin indicia of ownership.
2. As To Those Respondents Who Had Malin Hold
Their Seed For Speculation
We have already responded to this section of appellant's brief in Point No. 1 of this brief, wherein we
evaluated appellant's claim that respondents were guilty
of collusion and conspiracy against appellant. We will
not discuss this in greater detail, but we will set forth
Malin's testimony as to the custom of holding seed until
the market was more favorable.
"Sometimes they were holding because they
couldn't sell it (seed) at all. I mean, there are
times in the year when you cannot sell seed except
at a very reduced price. Now a grower gets those
times when it is impossible for him to sell seed.
Then, of course, it is usually when the market
has been low, naturally the~- want to hold them
for a higher price. They are speculating, I suppose, but at times when none of the seed buying
companies will buy seed, I don ~t know whether
a man is holding for speculation or not." (R.
48-49)
Appellant was fully fanuliar with the alfalfa seed market
and the custom of nu1ny fanners to hold their seed until
the market price was favorable.
Since appellant contends that Malin had no authority to ~tore seed whirh had not been purchased, it might
be helpful to point out (1) that appellant knew of the
practice of gnnn:'rs to hold their seed during slun1ps in
the 1narket (R . ..J-S) ~ (2) that smuetin1es a period of
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more than eight months would pass between advance
payments and actual purchase (Statement of Facts) ;
and (3) that some seed, e.g., Lot No. 1722, was held
from 1954 to 1956 before it was purchased and shipped,
(R. 60-61). Apparently appellant would continue negotiations while the seed thus remained in storage, (R.
48, 60-61).
Appellant also contends that respondents sought to
deal with Malin personally, and to rely upon his personal
credit. We fail to find anything in the record to sustain
such a contention. Malin admitted that, though he initially issued personal checks to accommodate the
growers, he soon was motivated to issue personal checks
solely by his own financial convenience, (R. 21). When
pressed for a specific recollection, Malin said that he
did not remember any of the respondents ever asking
him for a personal check, (R. 64). It is difficult to see
any indication that respondents sought to rely on :Malin's
personal credit.
In summary of our response to appellant's arguments on waiver and estoppel, we have shown (1) that
every one of Malin's procedures in making payments
and advances was approved by appellant; (2) that there
is no evidence that any of these respondents ever sold
their seed or that title passed to appellant; and ( 3)
that respondents made reasonable inquiry as to the
location of their seed and received various false explanations from Malin.
(d) The Trial Court Did Not Err in Holding
Appellant Liable For Conversion Of Plaintiff's Money By Wayne Malin
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Appellant's Point No. 4 questions the meaning of
the Findings, Conclusion and Decree. Appellant first
questions the conclusion that Malin "fraudulently converted (respondents') seed and/or money," and asserts
that if the money belonged to respondents they must
have been paid and cannot now assert a claim against
appellant. It is submitted that the finding is not obtuse;
that it simply means that Malin obtained money from
appellant which should have been delivered to respondents, and then converted that money to himself. This,
of course, presupposes that sales had been made by
respondents. If not, Malin converted respondents seed
and so did appellant.
Appellant's second question is whether ~Ialin acted
as agent of respondents in receiving money for them.
If so, it is contended that respondents' money would
have been converted by their own agent. rnder the facts
of tllis case, no serious contention can be made that
Malin acted as respondents' agent. \Ye have shown that
~I a lin represented appellant in negotiating with the
grower~. and, eYen when son1e growers w-ould not immediate I:· sell, .Jlalin would 1nake subsequent offers for
appellant when the 1narket would rise.
COXCLCSIOX
.\ ppPllant has only been held liable for the seed
ielt it actually received and for which respondents
ha vP not been fully paid. As to those respondents who
rPI'll~<'d to sell tht'ir seed, appellant is liable as a conVPI'h'r. As to thost~ respondents. if any, who accepted

''It
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a purchase price, appellant is liable for the unpaid
balance. It is respectfully submitted that the judgment
of the trial court was not in error, and that the judgment
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD

RAY

E.

w.

CLYDE

NASH

Attorneys for Respondents
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